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Reflections on the Creation
of a Unified Criminal Law
Dr. Theo Vogler*

Many commentators have pointed to the goal of creating a unified criminal
law, accepted in all countries and accompanied by an international penal
authority to secure its enforcement. 1 It is easy to recognize the great
advantages of a unified, global law. In the field of criminal law in particular, the compelling authority of a penal code would be much more persuasive to the individual citizen than today's criminal law, the proscriptions
of which vary from state to state. The law appears arbitrary, generating
exterior compliance but not true consent.
This insight becomes even more persuasive when one considers the
growing acceptance of general prevention as the purpose of criminal law.
By general prevention, I do not mean its negative aspects, deterrence of the
public or at least of potential offenders, but its positive aspect, development of a basis of trust and confidence. 2 A criminal law which changes
as one crosses the border and travels into another state is detrimental to
the goal of general prevention. Yet even on the comparatively narrow level
of the states represented in the Council of Europe, repeated efforts to work
out a European Criminal Code as a model of a unified criminal law have
led to nothing. 3 Nor do they stand a chance of coming to fruition in the
foreseeable future.
What makes the idea of a "World Law" appear utopian is not so much
the idea, but the premise that there should be, for any conflict, a solution
regarded as fair and efficient by all. If that premise held true, the development of a World Law would indeed be only a matter of time, as such
solutions, being "final truths," would necessarily gain universal acceptance
by their own momentum. Yet each attempt at defining, even for domestic
law, the scope of criminal behavior makes it obvious that such a premise
is totally unrealistic.
This insight does not preclude, however, efforts at reaching the goal of
*Professor of Law, University of Giessen; Member of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign
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an International Penal Code, at least in some areas. Unified solutions are
possible to the extent that they conform with the common interest of all
states and do not interfere with national interests of particular states. This
is the appropriate frame of reference for an evaluation of the Special Part
of the Draft International Criminal Code presented by Professor Bassiouni, 4 which is limited to particular acts which have been defined by
international agreements and outlawed as contrary to international law by
the community of nations. By restricting the Draft Code to that which is
politically feasible and necessary to achieve the purposes of penal policy,
its author has enhanced its prospects of being transferred into a binding
convention in the future.
Even a convention binding under international law cannot achieve
much, as long as its enforcement by courts of law is not guaranteed. The
fact that most member states of the Council of Europe have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the European Commission 5 as well as the European
Court of Human Rights, 6 gives rise to some hope; yet the traditional
reliance on the principle of national sovereignty is most likely to prevent
the recognition of a supranational penal authority for the foreseeable
future. It is therefore quite characteristic that, on the European level, many
commentators do not regard the authority of the Court of the European
Community to impose fines as a penal authority. 7 The fate of the efforts
to create an International Criminal Court 8 confirms the futility of all such
attempts.
In light of these facts, it is particularly noteworthy that the Committee
on International Criminal Law of the International Law Association has
presented the product of its work directed at the institution of a Commission of Criminal Inquiry. 9 This would be a step forward, operating as a
mechanism to support the proposal of an International Criminal Code. The
proposed International Commission of Criminal Inquiry shall have jurisdiction over violations of a number of international conventions, 10 more
or less identical with those enumerated in the Draft International Criminal
Code. 11The task of the Commission is limited to the investigation of
alleged violations of these conventions. It is a sort of international
prosecutorial agency. In order to fulfill its purpose, the Commission shall
have authority to collect all forms of evidence and, if there is probable
cause, to request contracting states to conduct searches and seizures. 12
The statute authorizes the Commission to act upon a petition by a
contracting state or by any person or non-governmental organization
claiming to be the victim of the alleged offense. 13 Having regard to the
facts established at the inquiry, the Commission shall: (a) terminate the
inquiry against the alleged offender, should the complaint appear to be
unfounded in law or in fact; or (b) declare the matter settled by consent
of all interested parties; or (c) recommend an indictment. 14 In pursuance
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of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by contracting states, the Commission
shall submit its recommendation of indictment and other findings to the
state where the suspected offender is present and request this state to act
accordingly.
Such an International Commission of Inquiry might represent a first
step toward an international court. Reservations based upon the idea of
national sovereignty carry less weight as against an international investigatory commission than against an international penal authority. Nevertheless, there is not much reason to be overly optimistic, if one examines the
overall political situation, characterized by several sharp splits in the community of nations.
The fact that a unified international penal law appears as a chimera
makes it even more important to promote efforts to carry into effect a
unified international penal policy. In the interest of the common transnational struggle against crime, the cooperation of the greatest possible number of states is necessary to adopt common principles for the effective use
of national penal authority. As crime has become international, penal
policy must cross national borders. 15
The twentieth century developments of penal policy should now bear
fruit on an international scale. It is no longer enough to bring the offender
to justice. The shift of emphasis toward prevention and rehabilitation has,
during the last few decades, led to a number of significant reforms in
national criminal legislation. These reforms should now be reflected at the
international level.
The tendency to replace short term imprisonment by other measureshaving the potential of making unnecessary the imposition or at least the
execution of imprisonment even for offenses of average seriousness-has
been the most important concern of reformers. In light of the increase of
transnational crime, that tendency, to be effective in important areas, must
be brought to bear in international relations by conferring supranational
recognition to the achievements of modern penal policy.
Prevention-oriented modern sanctioning systems liberally grant offenders the opportunity to avoid prison by abiding by the law while at large.
If these progressive sanctions of domestic law are not to lose their effect
at the border, the imposition of certain measures should not depend on the
nationality of the offender nor should such measures be rendered ineffective by lack of any control over their execution abroad. In Europe, the
European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally Sentenced or
Conditionally Released Offenders 16 has taken account of these considerations.
The convention allows a state which has sentenced an offender to request the assistance of the state in which the defendant ordinarily resides.
This assistance involves the supervision of the offender and, if the offender
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violates the conditions of his suspended sentence, the enforcement of the
sentence. Without this mechanism, courts often deny foreign defendants
the opportunity for probation and parole because of the difficulty of supervision.
The need to execute penal judgments pronounced abroad occurs not
only in cases of probation and parole but also in cases of fines and prison
sentences. The Convention on the Validity of Criminal Judgments 17 may
fill this need. Under the convention the sentencing state may, for example,
request the state where the offender normally resides to receive and imprison the offender. 18 The executing state then incorporates the foreign
judgment entirely into its own legal order. The principle ne his in idem is
therefore internationally applicable to judgments executed under the convention. 19 The convention thus closes a gap with respect not only to those
national laws which merely give credit for punishment suffered abroad,
but with respect also to the European Convention of Human Rights 20
which fails to guarantee the protection against being punished twice.
An international penal policy based on modem principles cannot satisfy
itself, however, with establishing the international validity of a penal
judgment as the final point of the proceeding; rather, the requirements of
penal policy must influence the assertion of criminal jurisdiction. The
coexistence of various grounds for establishing jurisdiction necessarily
leads to a tangled network of competing jurisdictions of different states
which all claim competence to try the defendant.
International recognition of the ne bis in idem principle is a first step
toward a set of rules which would prevent the battle of jurisdiction to be
fought at the cost of the defendant. Yet merely reducing the number of
recognized grounds for establishing jurisdiction in order to avoid cases of
multiple jurisdiction is not sufficient to solve the problem. Additionally,
in cases of multiple jurisdiction the defendant should preferably be tried
by the state which offers the best chances for his rehabilitation.
In many cases rehabilitation is most likely in the state of which the
offender is a citizen or a resident, as he speaks the language of that state,
is familiar with its customs and mores, and has social ties to its residents.
On the other hand, the interests of efficient law enforcement may speak
in favor of leaving jurisdiction to the state in which the offense was
committed, as the evidence is easily obtained there, increasing the chances
of solving the case.
Attempting to achieve a compromise between the conflicting interests
of efficient law enforcement on the one hand and better rehabilitation of
the offender on the other, the European Convention on the Transfer of
Proceedings in Criminal Matters 21 creates a novel European jurisdiction.
The convention enables a requested state to prosecute those who have
violated the laws of a requesting state when: the offender is a national or

MULTILATERAL COOPERATION FOR SUPPRESSING CRIME

275

resident of the requested state; the requested state otherwise plans to
imprison the offender; the requested state is prosecuting him for the same
offense as the requesting state; most of the relevant evidence is located in
the requested state; the requested state is most likely to improve the
prospects of rehabilitation; the requesting state cannot enforce a sentence
or cannot ensure the presence of the accused at his trial. At the same time,
the convention modifies the principle of mandatory prosecution adhered
to by some states, as it permits each contracting state to satisfy its duty
to prosecute by leaving prosecution and trial to the requested partner state
according to the provisions of the convention. 22
The idea of transferring criminal proceedings has led international
criminal law out of its isolation in the realm of domestic law to coordinate
penal policies on an international level. The transfer of criminal proceedings is not meant to extend the punitive authority of the state of residence
but to further the interests of the offender, who thereby gains the position
of a national whose case is tried before a domestic court, in his own
language and according to law familiar to him. Moreover, the prospect that
the foreign offender can also be prosecuted in the state of his residence may
reduce the need for the law enforcement agencies of the state in which the
offense was committed to use such procedural restraining measures as
pre-trial detention, bail, and impoundment.
The new developments in dealing with crime must not be limited to the
offender and his treatment, but must consider the victim of the criminal
offense. Some would argue that the state should bear responsibility if it
fails to prevent the commission of crimes with harmful effects, as it has
taken over the task of protecting its citizens by creating a state monopoly
in law enforcement. 23 Yet no international instruments deal with this area
of penal policy. It can hardly be denied that the victim's status constitutes
a subject of the philosophy of criminal justice in international criminal law
which is as important as the offender-oriented substantive criminal law.
International criminal law is faced with the task of developing a mechanism for restitution for injuries caused by offenses committed abroad.
Thus, there is a plethora of problems which international and municipal
law must solve in order to develop a unified international response to
crime. The European states have made important advances in developing
mechanisms to coordinate their domestic criminal procedures. Unfortunately, only a few countries have accepted these mechanisms. 24 Because
progress toward a unified substantive law is likely to be slow, and because
Europe and other regions face pressing problems in enforcing domestic
crimes in a manner consistent with modem penal policy, nations must
expand their efforts to coordinate their criminal procedures.
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